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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondent's brief makes certain allegations and 
representations which are simply untrue and therefore call 
for a response. In addition, Appellant believes that the 
recent decision of this Court in the case of L.A. Young 
Sons Construction Co. v. County of Tooele, et al., 575 
P.2d 1034 (1978), is dispositive of this case. 
This brief is therefore deemed necessary but will 
be limited in scope. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'. S ASSERTIONS REGARDING REPRE-
SENTATIONS BY VIRGIL MITCHELL ARE NOT 
SUPPORTABLE EITHER FACTUALLY OR LEGALLY 
AND THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS REGARDING SAME 
ARE ERRONEOUS. 
In its brief on pages 15 and 16 the Respondent 
alleges that "witnesses for Thorn testified that Mr. 
Mitchell represented that material from the Utelite Pit 
was available and could be used as borrow on the project." 
Respondent then cites pages 38-39; 55-56 of the record as 
support for this allegation. Appellant's counsel has ex-
amined these two references and there is absolutely no 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reference on the four cited pages to any statement 
by Virgil Mitchell concerning anything, let alone the 
borrow source in question. 
The fact is, no witness in this trial ever 
testified that Mr. Mitchell said anything more than that 
the Utelite Pit was a "possible source.~ In fact, these 
words are the exact words used by Respondent's chief wit-
ness on this point, Grant Thorn, during his direct testi-
mony. (R. 8, 9) On cross-examination, he again used 
the term "possible source of borrow" (R. 12). 
He also stated in response to a question on 
cross-examination about the material as follows: 
Question: In your conversations with 
Mr. Mitchell did you ask him whether the 
material had been tested? 
Answer: No, we assumed that it had. 
(Emphasis supplied.) (R. 11) 
Obviously, if the trial Court concluded that Mr. 
Mitchell made a "positive representation" to Thorn regar~ 
ing the Utelite material as Respondent alleges on page 17 
of its brief, the Court's conclusion is not supported by 
the facts in evidence. 
Legally, the Respondent cites the case of ~ 
Morrill Co. v. State of California, 59 Cal.Rpt>_-. 479, 423 
P.2d 551 (1967) as authority for its position that Appel-
lant is liable to Respondent for the alleged representatior 
-2-
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of Appellant's employee Mitchell. 
There are two problems with Respondent's 
reliance on Morrill. The first is that there was no 
"positive" representation by Appellant's employee 
Mitchell as already explained hereinabove. The second 
problem is that the Morrill case is not applicable to 
the situation we have here. The recent case of L.A. 
Young Sons Construction Company v. County of Tooele, 
et al., supra, is, however, directly applicable to this 
case. In that case the Court said the following at 
page 1039: 
..• Plaintiff's entire claim reduced 
to its basic elements is that defendant should 
bear responsibility for any condition which 
plaintiff did not subjectively anticipate and 
that defendant had a duty to assure that the 
conditions at the project site reached all of 
plaintiff's optimistic expectations. This 
theory is contrary to all the aforecited law. 
This Court in the Young case, supra, also relied on 
Wunderlich v. State of California, 65 Cal.2d 777, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 473, 423 P.2d 545 (1967). In said case it is stated 
as follows at page 550: 
• . • Defendant had no knowledge of any 
impediments to performance an~ ~ad made no 
misrepresentations as to cond~tions. To hold 
defendant liable under such circumstances would 
cast upon it responsibility for all conditions 
a contractor might encounter and ~ake that cost 
of the project an unknown quantity. 
-3-
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From the facts and the foregoing legal author-
ities it is obvious that as stated by Grant Thorn, they 
assumed that the Utelite source was a suitable source. 
It is submitted that this assumption arose not from any 
representation or misrepresentation by Appellant's em-
ployee Virgil Mitchell, but from their own assumptions 
about the Utelite source and its suitability. 
In the words of the L.A. Young case at page 10 
. . if statements honestly made may 
be suggestive only, expenses caused by un-
foreseen conditions will be placed on the 
contractor, especially if the contract so 
stipulates .... 
The trial Court's conclusion that Respondent 
was entitled to recover for alleged misrepresentations 
by Virgil Mitchell is obviously in error. 
Likewise, the Court's conclusion that language 
in Sections 102.05 and 106.02 of the Standard Specifica 
tions which requires the contractor to examine the con-
struction site and determine the availability of materi 
does not apply is clearly wrong as is apparent from a 
reading of the L.A. Young case, supra. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S ANALYSIS OF THE PARSON CASE IS 
INCORRECT AND SAID CASE IS CLEARLY DISTIN-
GUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE. 
-4-
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In its First Point on Appeal, Respondent 
goes into an involved argument regarding the case of 
Jack B. Parson Construction Company v. State of Utah, 
552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976). 
While Appellant does not necessarily disagree 
with the quoted portions of that opinion set forth in 
Respondent's brief, Appellant does not agree that said 
case is in any way controlling on the issues of this 
case. 
On page 11 of its brief, Respondent asserts that 
"Thorn attempted to negotiate a supplemental agreement." 
The record does not show that Respondent made a serious 
effort to negotiate a supplemental agreement at any time 
during the project. The record does show that Respondent 
refused to provide cost data as requested by Appellant. 
The record further shows that Respondent's so-called at-
tempt to "negotiate" was a claim based on a total cost 
approach using rental rates obviously not related to Re-
spondent's actual costs. This approach, if accepted, 
would simply indemnify Respondent for its entire costs 
regardless of whether these costs were necessary or 
whether the work was accomplished in an economical f ash-
ion. 
Appellant submits that Section 104.02 of the 
Standard specifications and particularly subsection 2 is 
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intended to protect the contractor in the event an 
item underruns in excess of 25%. It is further obvious 
from the language of the specification that profit on 
the portion of the item which underruns is not to be 
considered. It is further obvious that the first 25% 
of the alteration in quantity is not to be considered. 
The specification says " . . In the event of a de-
crease, any adjustments in payment shall apply to the 
quantity or quantities of work actually performed." 
Appellant submits that this does not give carte blanche 
authority to turn a bid which may have been erroneous or 
insufficient into a profit making item. 
In the instant case the Respondent bid $1.20 
per ton. His projected costs for loading, hauling, plK-
ing and compacting the material was $0.95. No matter 
what approach is used to deal with the quantity that the 
item underruns can justify payment of any portion of 
this amount to Respondent. These operations are all 
direct charges which he did not incur as a result of a 
reduction in the item. They represent such items as 
labor, fuel and equipment charges which he did not incur. 
In round figures the estimated quantity of the item was 
28,000 cubic yards. A 25% underrun would be 7,000 cub~ 
yards. The actual used quantity was 15,000 cubic yards. 
-6-
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The underrun quantity was 6,000 cubic yards. The Ap-
pellant's interpretation of the specification is that 
to the extent of said excess underrun of 6,000 cubic 
yards the Respondent should recover anything it would 
otherwise realize had the item not underrun. Since 
the $0.95 direct charges would not benefit Respondent, 
he should recover the balance of the price of the item 
over and above the direct charges less profit which is 
specifically excluded from the computation. 
It is conceivable that the item actually costs 
the Respondent more than his bid price. This of ten re-
sults from miscalculation or in some instances results 
from what is called an "unbalanced bid." This means the 
contractor reduces his calculated price by a certain 
amount and adds it to another bid item such as "mobiliza-
tion" or some item which is paid at an earlier point in 
the contract. 
If Respondent's figures as to its actual costs 
are correct, then it would appear that Respondent made 
a "bad bid" or has "unbalanced" its bid. In either 
event, Appellant submits that its responsibility under 
the contract specification ends at the point Respondent 
recovers its bid price less direct costs and profit on 
the 6,000 yards underrun in quantity, which Appellant 
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asserted previously in its brief amounts to $1,791.30. 
To award anything over and above said amount results 
in a windfall to Respondent. 
Appellant submits that the Parson case, supra, 
deals with an overall underrun in the total contract 
and not just one "major item" as we have in this situation.· 
The two cases do not equate. 
For these reasons Appellant submits that the 
award by the trial Court is excessive to the extent that 
it allows Respondent relief for an underrun in the quan-
tity of "granular borrow" in excess of $1,791.30. 
POINT III 
RECENT DECISIONS SUPPORT ARGUMENTS URGED 
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF UNDER POINT II. 
In Point II of Appellant's brief, the Appellant 
has argued that Respondent's failure to timely notify Ap· 
pellant of its intention to file a claim for additional 
compensation as required by the contract specifications 
is a waiver of any right to recover for the i terns claimed. 
The Tennessee Court has recently construed a 
similar provision in the case of W & 0 Construction Co., 
Inc. v. City ~f Smithville, 557 S.W.2d 920 (1977). In 
that case a contractor brought suit against a municipali~ 
-8-
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to recover extra costs incurred in rock removal while 
constructing a wastewater treatment plant. The Supreme 
Court held that such recovery was barred where the con-
tractor failed to comply wi'th the t t 1 · 
. con rac ua requirement 
that it obtain a written change order to obtain extra 
compensation. Furthermore, the Court found no facts 
showing a waiver, modification, or abrogation of that 
express contractual requirement. 
This failure to give timely notice was also 
held to deny compensation in Pennsylvania in the case of 
Central Penn. Industries, Inc. v. Penn DOT, 358 A.2d 445, 
(1976). This case is somewhat similar to the instant 
case. In this case the contractor was required under the 
contract to obtain granular material to complete the top 
of the project's embankments. After performing almost 
no investigation to locate such material on the project 
site, the contractor went to off-site borrow pits to locate 
the material. They then sought to recover the additional 
expense from the commonwealth. The contractor was awarded 
the costs by the Board of Arbitration of Claims, the evi-
dence, ignored by the board, however, showed that the con-
tractor made no mention of a claim until four years after 
it secured the borrow excavation. The Commonwealth Court 
noted that the proper ten-day written notice was not given 
and reversed the decision of the board. 
-9-
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Needless to say, the trial Court in the 
instant case has ignored the required notice provi-
sions of Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the relief requested 
previously in its brief is appropriate and submits that 
the Respondent has not refuted those arguments in its 
brief. Appellant further submits that Respondent has 
attempted to confuse and mislead the Court as to the 
actual state of the record regarding the testimony con-
cerning alleged representations involving a materials 
source by Appellant's employee Virgil Mitchell. Finally, 
Appellant respectfully urges the Court to reverse the 
ruling of the District Court and award judgment against 
Appellant for $1,791.30 or alternatively for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, Attorney General 
··/' . . .• . - ---:;/ 
--:, -~c 
. - /::..-- ·'· ~-----~ -,(/,,/ 4 . / -- ,; ~ . By~/-~~'-- / . ,· l / LELAND D. FORD ~ 
ssistant Attorney General 
ttorney for Appellant 
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foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Steven H. Stewart, Attorney for Respondent, 
220 South Second East, Suite No. 450, Salt Lake City, 
, 'J ,, ('. ·- I , Utah 84111, this "''""'-day of *;..u,..,,_Lu..A,.. , 1978. 
d/ \ 
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